In trade agreements, governments can design remedies to ensure compliance (property rule) or to compensate victims (liability rule). This paper describes an economic framework to explain the pattern of remedies over non-tariff restrictions-particularly domestic subsidies and nonviolation complaints subject to liability rules. The key determinants of the contract form for any individual measure are the expected joint surplus from an agreement and the expected loss to the constrained government. The loss is higher for domestic subsidies and nonviolations because these are the policies most likely to correct domestic distortions.
Introduction
An important decision in trade agreement design is whether remedies should ensure compliance or instead allow breach with appropriate compensation. In standard law and economics parlance, the former defines a property rule, while the latter defines a liability rule.
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This paper applies economic theory to understand the history of property rules vs. liability rules in the GATT/WTO, and its particular aim is to understand remedies for non-tariff measures. I focus on two stylized facts from this history: (1) the progression from a system of liability rules under the GATT to a system of property rules under the WTO; 2 and (2) two remaining examples of liability rules are actionable subsidies and non-violation complaints. 3 In proposing an explanation, I first observe that the two examples of liability rules each primarily regulate nondiscriminatory domestic policies that could be first-best policy solutions. Building on this observation, I argue that governments choose a liability rule when the loss to a government from a policy constraint is large relative to the potential gains from cooperation, and such is the case for actionable domestic subsidies and non-violations.
Here I describe key features of the proposed economic framework. Potential policies to include in trade agreements exhibit heterogeneity in both the ex-ante expected global gains from coordination and the ex-ante expected loss to the government whose policy is constrained. After signing an agreement, relative payoffs from cooperation are subject to shocks that are unverifiable and non-contractible. The choice to include a policy in the agreement or not then depends on whether the gains from coordination are worth the dispute costs, and policies with high ex-ante expected losses are far more likely to result in disputes. Disputes are necessary for enforcement, but they come with high costs, large enough to swamp the gains for coordination on the marginal policies included in the contract, though filing disputes is still individually rational.
One advantage of the liability rule is that it reduces the incentive to file disputes that are jointly inefficient. With fewer disputes also comes lower probability of compliance overall, but larger gains conditional on compliance. The advantages of the liability rule are largest when the ex-ante loss to the constrained country is large relative to the gains from coordination, because such policies have the largest potential for disputes.
I argue the framework can explain the pattern of liability rules vs. property rules in the GATT/WTO. Achieving compliance is more difficult on actionable subsidies and nonviolations because of the potential benefits of these policies, so my economic framework suggests these policies will be subject to liability rules. I support my argument using (1) the negotiation history and case law of non-violations and (2) the negotiating history of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. As for the progression from liability rules in the GATT to property rules in the WTO, the economic framework suggests this results from increases in gains from coordination over time, and such coordination gains have indeed occurred due to falling trade costs.
The paper contributes to the literature by providing an economic explanation for longpuzzling distinctions in remedies in the WTO. For example, Bagwell criticizes the SCM for regulating export subsidies with the harsher property rule punishment compared to the lighter liability rule punishment for actionable domestic subsidies. 4 Pauwelyn questions why "politically and culturally more controversial commitments such as those under WTO agreements on health and safety are more rigidly protected under a property rule." 5 More recently, Maggi and Staiger argue that the property rule vs. liability rule choice depends on the uncertainty in expected outcomes after contracting over any individual policy, and that such uncertainty is higher in both domestic subsidy and non-violation cases. 6 They argue that greater uncertainty means greater possibility of breach being first-best ex-post, and the liability rule allows for this efficient breach. While they focus on second moments of payoffs, I focus on the first moments, and I argue that properties of the first moments are the key distinguishing features of the policies in question.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 details the background on liability rules vs. property rules in the GATT/WTO. Section 3 details the economic framework. Section 4 discusses the case law and negotiating history. Section 5 concludes. 
Background
This section details the legal and economic facts which motivate the analysis.
Specifically, I discuss property rules vs. liability rules in the GATT/WTO, I explain why actionable subsidies and non-violations are classified as liability rules, and I detail relevant economic features of actionable subsidies and non-violations.
The key distinction between property rules and liability rules, per the Calabresi and Melamed classification, is that the property rules offer an entitlement that can be taken only with the holder's consent, while liability rules offer entitlements that can be taken with appropriate compensation. 7 In the domestic law context, the broad conclusion is that the optimal contract progresses from property rule to liability rule as the transaction costs of bargaining increase.
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The question of what is a property rule or liability rule in the GATT/WTO context is murkier, because there is no comparably powerful international authority that can enforce property rules as in the domestic law context, and rarely do we observe interstate transfers typical of liability rules. Both enforcement and payment in the GATT/WTO are typically achieved through tariff retaliation. Paulewyn makes a convincing case that the WTO is largely a property rule regime, since in most matters, the case in not closed until compliance is achieved by removing the offending policy, or the complainant settles. 9 Though tariff retaliation is a form of compensation in the WTO, disproportionate retaliation designed to ensure enforcement is characteristic of a property rule. Still some GATT/WTO remedies classify as liability rules because the cases can be closed through adjustments without the consent of the complainant.
The difference in rules between export subsidies and domestic subsidies in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures exemplifies the difference between property rules and liability rules in the WTO. Export subsidies are in the "prohibited category" for which a subsidizing country should "withdraw the subsidy without delay" per Article 4.7. In contrast, for an "actionable" domestic subsidy, members "shall take appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects or shall withdraw the subsidy." To enforce the limited set of options for export subsidies requires harsher punishment than for domestic subsidies, such as disproportionate retaliation in My assessment of the economic facts has focused on the first moments of expected payoffs to countries who agree to actionable domestic subsidy rules and non-violations. In contrast, the theories of Maggi and Staiger argue that these policies are subject to liability rules due to higher uncertainty in their evaluation from the dispute settlement body. 17 As evidence, they put forth that domestic subsidies and non-violations are more likely to involve import-competing industries subject to political shocks that the DSB cannot easily evaluate. Such an argument is readily applicable to contingent protection like safeguards, for which the criterion regards injury to domestic production for the country imposing the safeguard. But for actionable subsidies the criterion is about adverse effects of tradedistorting subsidies, and for non-violations the criterion is about nullification and impairment of benefits. The laws for actionable subsidies and non-violations are about evaluating external effects of the policies, and not at all about evaluating the domestic benefits. 18 Comparing the criteria for safeguards to the criteria for these domestic policies, the law for these domestic policies does not require assessment of injury to the member from removing the disputed policy (i.e. the overall benefit from imposing the policy in addition to trade benefits). So it is then questionable that relative DSB inability to assess 16 See STAIGER; SYKES, 2013. 17 See MAGGI; STAIGER (forthcoming). 18 The external effects, of course, could be positively correlated with the domestic benefits.
domestic effects of these policies compared to other policies is what is driving the liability rule choice, given that that the law is indifferent to variation in the domestic effects that a re deemed useful information for other WTO laws.
The theory that follows instead argues that the main driver of the liability rule choice is the relative loss to the constrained country, compared to the gains from cooperation. To contrast with the hypothesis that uncertainty alone drives the choice, I compare two hypothetical policies which have the same expected gains from cooperation and the same ex-post uncertainty in policy payoffs, so the probability of "efficient breach" for both policies is the same. 19 The difference between the policies instead is that one is characterized by a large expected loss to the constrained country, while other policies have a smaller expected loss. This variation alone can lead to a liability rule for the policy with the higher transfer of welfare between nations from any restriction over a single policy, and a property rule for the policies with the lower transfer of welfare between nations from any restriction over a single policy. The conventional economic theory I described above then suggests that actionable subsidies and non-violations require a relatively higher shift in welfare across nations to achieve gains, so they are a better suited to be governed by liability rules. The new theory will then explain the tradeoffs between liability rules and property rules in such an environment and how this fits with negotiating history and case law of the GATT/WTO.
Theory
I propose a two-country model of bilateral agreements such that countries negotiate over several different policies which can differ in the joint surplus of the first-best agreement, as well as who gains and who loses. Governments choose to contract over a symmetric set of policies which are the same in the expected gains from cooperation but exhibit heterogeneity in the loss to the country whose policy is constrained. Here loss can be interpreted in the broad political economic sense from a government preference function -so payoffs could include economic
19 By "efficient breach" I mean simply that ex-post nations are better off not complying with the contract for a particular policy. Paulewyn (2008) argues for a stronger standard in using this term, noting that breach is efficient only when the other party is fully compensated. I follow the usage of Maggi and Staiger (forthcoming) in comparing contracts' ability to facilitate efficient breach as I have defined it, i.e. to move closer to the ideal.
factors in the sense of national income maximization, but also distributional concerns. 20 A cooperative agreement is then achieved by contracting over several policies that lead to losses for one country for any individual policy in the contract, but the overall contract exhibits gains for each country. The objective of the agreement is to maximize the joint gains of the negotiating nations, whatever their aims may be.
Governments act in a sequential game as follows:
1. For each policy, governments maximize the ex-ante expected gains from the agreement by choosing between (1) a liability rule, (2) a property rule or (3) no contract.
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2. Unverifiable mean-zero shocks are realized for the payoffs to both governments for noncooperation and cooperation over each policy 3. Each government decides whether to renege on the contract for an individual policy.
In doing so, each government anticipates the other government's decision to file a dispute and the potential cost of such a dispute.
4. For any violations, governments decide to file dispute at a cost, anticipating an uncertain DSB decision.
5. The DSB rules with exogenous accuracy.
6. If a property rule was chosen and DSB ruling favors the complainant, then payoffs are realized when the policy is removed. If a liability rule was chosen, then the target of the complaint can then choose to compensate the complainant. The complainant is assured to be worse off from compensation (under the liability rule) relative to compliance (under the property rule) because unverifiable shocks to the complainant are uncompensated.
Such a game can then be solved through backward induction, whereby at each step the choice rule for each government is solved for based on the expected payoffs from future stages.
This model clarifies the tradeoffs between liability rules and property rules. The two rules differ both in the level and type of compliance with the contract, and also in the number of disputes filed. Because the inefficiency of the liability rule overall reduces the incentive to use the dispute settlement system given the errors in compensation, the incentives fall for potential complainants to file disputes under liability rules, which in turn induces far greater breach under liability rules. 22 But the breach under liability rules is more likely to be efficient (e.g. the joint payoffs are greater than if the contract were followed) then would be the case under property rules. When the costs of filing disputes is sufficiently large-such that dispute costs are large enough to swamp joint payoffs, but filing a dispute is still individually rationale-the reduction in disputes from the liability rule is also an advantage.
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How the loss to the constrained country then affects the liability rule choice than depends on how this loss interacts with the various tradeoffs. Disputes are more likely when the loss to the constrained country is high, holding the joint payoff fixed, as it is more likely that a particular issue will satisfy the threshold for dispute costs. Choosing liability rules for such policies becomes optimal, because of the lower use of the DSB, and compared to the property rule, the DSB is more likely to be invoked when there is potential for efficient breach, and there is more compliance when breach is inefficient.
Evidence
I compare here how the theory matches with GATT/WTO negotiating history and case law. Section 2 already noted how the SCM negotiation history recognizes subsidies' legitimate uses. The fact that domestic subsidies can be maintained once adverse effects are removed reflects a standard "efficient breach" logic. The revealed preference that governments are willing to impose such subsidies, while potentially bearing costs of compensation and dispute, is the credible demonstration of the domestic benefits of any such
policy. An additional bullet point from the negotiating history is also revealing: "The SCM 22 Again, to be clear, I use breach here to mean breach permitted by the contract leading to disputes, rather than a breach of the overall agreement, which is assumed to be binding. 23 In such a case, economists would endorse a tax for using the dispute settlement system, but such a policy is problematic due to the inefficiency of international transfers. Liability protection limits disputes to similarly enhance efficiency. 
